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POWER PREPONDERANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS:  
EXPLAINING REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1960-1997 
 
 
 
 
    
Introduction 
The promotion of regional integration is one of the more significant decisions in the post-
WW II international political economy. Regional integration is a process in which two or 
more nations within a geographical region voluntarily adjust economic and other policies 
to produce a fusion of their economies and political institutions. This results in a slow 
pooling of nation-state sovereignty in evolving supranational institutions. The variation 
of this pooling is wide. Large amounts of sovereignty to date have already been pooled 
by Western European countries in the European Union (EU). At the opposite end of 
spectrum, we see nations of Latin America and the Caribbean in the same process but not 
having reached the same level of regional integration. The purpose of this paper is to 
explore the conditions conducive to regional economic integration in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. A review of the literature points to two fundamental conditions:  domestic 
and regional. These conditions comprise the incentives and the disincentives for the 
propensity of country pairs to integrate. 
 
  We examine Latin American and Caribbean integration for three reasons. First, 
we wish to explore the dynamics of the process of integration in the developing world. 
Second, the western hemisphere is a unique laboratory for integration. In the latter half of 
the twentieth century, four regional economic integration projects emerged in Latin 
America and the Caribbean:  the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur in Spanish 
or Mercosul in Portuguese); the Andean Common Market (also known as the Andean 
Pact); the Central American Common Market (CACM), which later became the Central 
American Integration System (SICA); and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
1 Due 
to the longevity of some projects, the off-again and on-again traits of others, the uneven 
pace of development of regional institutions, and the mix of different sized countries, we 
have a variation along many dimensions. Third, the recent discussions for the resurrection 
of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) warrant an examination of Latin 
American and Caribbean integration to determine the feasibility of the FTAA.  
 
  At first, regional integration stands at odds with the conventional wisdom of 
political science. Kenneth Waltz,
2 Joseph Grieco,
3 and other (neo)realists have argued 
                                                 
1 In addition, Mexico joined a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada, forming the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
3 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42: xx, 1988. 
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that international cooperation is difficult to achieve in the anarchic world of the 
international system. In the absence of a central authority in the international system, they 
contend, states behave competitively; they attempt to maximize relative gains in order to 
assure their survival. Moreover, most militarized disputes have arisen between 
geographically contiguous countries. In this light, regional economic integration poses an 
interesting puzzle because it occurs among countries that are geographically proximate 
and because the economic gains accrued from economic cooperation to one or more of 
the constituent states may be used against another member-state in the future. Hence, 
regional economic integration requires an explanation. Under what conditions is regional 
economic integration possible and likely to progress?  
 
  Stimulated by the desire to explain the deepening of European regional 
integration, explanations of regional integration have proliferated in the last two decades. 
Put simply, there are three strands of research tradition in integration theories. One 
includes the (neo)functionalist and (neo)institutionalist schools. Another of these strands 
stresses international dimensions: the (neo)realist. The final perspective looks to domestic 
forces of regional integration. The present research draws heavily upon (neo)realism—
particularly power transition theory—and the domestic politics approach to understand 
the initiation and deepening of regional economic integration. We argue that regional 
integration is an outcome that emerges out of the interaction between international and 
domestic forces. We will show, by using panel corrected standard error OLS and Cox 
proportional hazards regression models on a sample of Latin American and Caribbean 
regional integration projects, that economic integration is most likely to proceed when 
relative economic power of integrating states are asymmetrical and they share common 
economic policy preferences.
4 Conversely, our empirical analyses indicate that the effect 
of economic power asymmetry on the level of integration becomes progressively 
negative for countries with dissimilar foreign policy preferences at given levels of mutual 
trade interests. 
 
  This paper proceeds using the following organizational format. The second 
section reviews theories of regional integration. The third section discusses the model, 
hypotheses, and data used to test the main arguments of this paper. The fourth section 
presents data analyses, and the final section concludes.  
 
The Literature on Regional Integration 
Although the literature on regional integration and cooperation abounds, general theories 
of regional economic integration are still at the nascent stage. In addition, most of these 
works either focus on European integration or were inspired by it. Theories of regional 
integration can be roughly grouped into three perspectives: (1) (neo)functionalism and 
(neo)institutionalism; (2) (neo)realism; and (3) domestic politics and 
intergovernmentalism.  
 
                                                 
4 Power preponderance and asymmetry are used interchangeably in this paper.   
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  In the first group, (neo)functionalism posits that regional integration arises due to 
increasing technological, economic, and other complexities and problems that countries 
can no longer effectively solve at the nation-state level.
5  According to this perspective, 
governments are likely to enter cooperative arrangements in order to cope with various 
functional needs, such as the improvement of economic welfare for their citizens. Once 
the political elite establishes a cooperative arrangement, the theory predicts that 
integration would become self-perpetuating through a “spillover” process.
6  Through this 
mechanism, success in one functional area increases demands for cooperative 
arrangements in other functional areas. While (neo)functionalism was influential in the 
1950s and 1960s, it has been criticized as being a post hoc theory having difficulties in 
generating testable hypotheses. Not only is it difficult to identify a priori exactly what 
issue-areas and what levels of significance of problems command regional cooperation or 
integration, but also functional needs do not necessarily pre-determine the direction of 
change that countries choose to pursue.
7  
  
Neoinstitutionalism, which emerged in the 1980s, inherited the thinking of the 
(neo)functionalist school. Put simply, neoinstitutionalists argue that international 
institutions promote international cooperation by helping constituent members overcome 
collective action problems. By lengthening the shadow of the future and by increasing 
transparency and enforcement of cooperation, international institutions facilitate issue-
linkages and strategies of reciprocity and make international commitments more 
credible.
8  Keohane,
9 for example, claims that it is possible to create and sustain, even 
after the decline of the power of a hegemonic state, international regimes in order to cope 
with market failures, reduce transaction costs, and respond to other problems that are 
difficult to be managed at the national level. With respect to European integration, 
“supranational” institutionalists have studied the impact of the European Union 
institutions on the decision-making process, such as the agenda-setting power of the 
European Parliament.
10  On the other hand, Garrett and Weingast argue that institutions 
perform other roles and are not simply the facilitators of efficiency gains in the process of 
regional integration.
11   These scholars maintain that institutions may provide focal 
                                                 
5  Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958); David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin 
Robertson Press, 1975). 
6 Haas, The Uniting of Europe. 
7 Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973). 
8 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” in Kenneth Oye (ed), 
Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986; Lisa L. Martin, Coercive 
Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992; 
Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International 
Monetary Affairs,” American Political Science Review 94: 819-835, 2000. 
9  Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
10 George Tsbelis, “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter,” American 
Political Science Review 88: 128, 1994; Geoffrey Garret and George Tsebelis, “An Institutional Critique of 
Intergovernmentalism,” International Organization 50: 269, 1996. 
11 Geoffrey Garret and Barry R. Weingast, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European 
Community’s Internal Market,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy 
(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
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points—precedents and symbols around which actors’ behaviors converge—that help 
determine particular choices made at critical decision points.  
 
  Neoinstitutionalism has stimulated important research on international 
cooperation and integration. However, applying this research to understand non-
European regional integration has been limited. This dearth of research may be due to the 
weak supranational institutional developments outside of Europe. Moreover, the degree 
of institutionalization itself is a variable that needs explication, but neoinstitutionalism, 
except for resorting to the functionalist argument of efficiency gains, has a difficulty 
explaining the emergence of supranational regional institutions. Yet, efficiency-based 
arguments cannot tell why institutions came into existence when they did. Furthermore, 
researchers have criticized neoinstitutionalism for its focus on absolute gains, neglecting 
the possibility of absolute losses
12 and relative gains.
13 
 
  Realism and neorealism stress the distribution of power among states as a central 
factor influencing international outcomes. The principal proposition of Waltzian 
structuralist realism is that the asymmetric gains from exchange tend to hinder 
international cooperation.
14  However, many (neo)realists do not completely rule out such 
possibilities. For example, some neorealist theorists argue that commercial liberalization 
is more likely among states that are political and military allies than among states that are 
actual or potential adversaries.
15  According central importance to relative gains, Grieco 
advanced a “relative disparity shift” hypothesis: a trend of a shifting relative disparity in 
the capabilities of states within a region is likely to lead disadvantaged states to oppose 
the development of formal regional institutions while relative stability of capabilities 
tends to foster the establishment and deepening of such regional arrangements.
16  
Grieco’s study comparing relative capability change and the development of regional 
integration in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas largely supports his 
hypothesis.  
 
  Hegemonic stability theory likewise emphasizes the importance of power for 
international political and economic outcomes. The early version of hegemonic stability 
theory concerned the rise and maintenance of liberal international economic order.
17 
Proponents of hegemonic stability theory argued that the presence of a hegemonic state 
(that is capable of and committed to promoting economic liberalism) was a necessary 
                                                 
12 Thomas Oately and Robert Nabors, “Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and 
the Basle Accord, International Organization 52: xx, 1998. 
13 Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation.” 
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation.” 
15 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political 
Science Review 87: 408, 1993; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994; Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the 
International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
16 Joseph M. Grieco, “Systemic Sources of Variation in regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, 
East Asia, and the Americas,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (eds), The Political Economy 
of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
17 Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, 28: 317, 1976; 
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987).    The other focus of hegemonic stability theory has been international peace and conflict. 
  6   
condition to sustain liberal international commerce. The erosion of hegemony, by 
contrast, tends to give rise to protectionism. In line with this argument, Robert Gilpin 
recently advanced a thesis that the existence of one or more powerful states committed to 
integration is the key to a success of the evolution of regional economic institutions.
18 
  
  Like other (neo)realist theories, power transition theory focuses on the relative 
power of countries in the international system. Unlike other (neo)realist theories, 
however, power transition scholars stress the satisfaction with the status quo relationship 
between dyads of countries and the dynamics of a power transition that occurs when a 
subordinate power approaches and exceeds a preponderant power in capabilities.
19  As 
applied to international conflict, power transition theory posits that conflict is likely to 
occur when subordinate and preponderant powers are at near parity and are dissatisfied 
with the status quo relationship. In contrast, a peaceful transition occurs if both powers 
share compatible preferences and are therefore jointly satisfied with the status quo 
relationship. Efird and Genna (2002) extended the theory and argue that the development 
of regional integration after a power transition between two satisfied powers improves 
because the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest in not only maintaining but 
also furthering and institutionalizing the arrangements that it believes to have contributed 
to its rise.
20 Efird and Genna’s statistical test provides strong support for their hypothesis.  
 
Yet, power transition theory, as well as other perspectives in (neo)realist schools 
of thought, is conspicuously silent about the sources of states’ preferences regarding 
regional economic integration. Given a central role that states’ preferences are expected 
to play in regional economic policy formulation, rather than leaving states’ preferences 
ambiguous and generic, we should identify which preferences matter in determining the 
propensity for regional economic integration. In other words, we need to identify where 
joint satisfaction originates.  
 
  The final group of regional economic integration research stresses the importance 
of domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining. By “taking preferences 
seriously,”
21  this literature emphasizes the distributional consequences of economic 
policies for domestic societal groups and the desire of political leaders to hold onto 
power. At its core, the scholars working with this approach contend that governments’ 
economic policies are strongly influenced by distributional conflict among societal 
groups; that groups that expect to lose from integration will oppose it and those that 
                                                 
18 Gilpin, Global Political Economy. 
19 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 1
st edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958; A.F.K. Organski, World 
Politics, 2
nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968; A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, “The Costs of 
Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor,” American Political Science Review, 71: 1347, 1977; A.F.K. Organski 
and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Tammen et al. Power 
Transitions: Strategies for the 21
st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000). 
20 Brian Efird and Gaspare M. Genna, “Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration,” 
European Union Politics 3, 2002. 
21   Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51: 513, 1997. 
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anticipate to benefit from it will support it; and that economic policies often reflect the 
preferences of the more powerful and better organized interest groups within society.
22  
 
  Interest group politics, however, is not the whole story. Politicians have their 
preferences and interests. In this literature, politicians’ desire to retain office is assumed 
to be the crucial guiding principle of policy making. Moreover, competition among 
interest groups vying to influence governments’ policies is not unstructured. Domestic 
political institutions are argued to shape the patterns of interactions between domestic 
groups and whose interests will be represented in governments’ policies.
23  
 
  Similarly, intergovernmentalism posits that economic interests are the driving 
forces of regional integration. Moravcsik argues that commercial interests of leading 
domestic producers, macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions, 
bargaining among powerful national governments over the distributive and institutional 
issues account for the developments of European integration.
24  Haggard generally agrees 
with Moravcsik’s thesis. Haggard contends that the more powerful states largely shaped 
the bargaining agendas in economic integration in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. 
However, the interests of weaker states also affected—although to a lesser degree—the 
regional economic agreements on the agenda.
25  What is crucial, in Haggard’s view, for 
economic integration to proceed is the convergence of preferences among parties to 
regional agreements that facilitate the bargaining and construction of regional economic 
blocs among member-states. According to Haggard, the difference between the 
developments of East Asian and Latin American regional integration is accounted for by 
the difference in the convergence or divergence of preferences of member countries about 
the direction and extent of economic integration. In Latin America, severe economic 
crises of the 1980s promoted preferences in various countries for deeper regional 
economic integration, whereas the lack of a similar crisis in Asia (until very recently) has 
kept economic and institutional preferences of Asian nations relatively diverged. In 
addition, Yi Feng and Gaspare Genna also find that homogeneity of preferences among 
member countries not only facilitates integration, but that integration promotes greater 
homogeneity among members.
26  This mutually reinforcing mechanism not only explains 
                                                 
22 Jeffry A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 
1965-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Jeffry A. Frieden, “Who Wins? Who Loses?” 
Foreign Policy September 1998: 25, 1998; Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988; Helen Milner, “Industries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade 
Blocs,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Ronald Rogowski, commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously.”  
23 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42: 427-460, 1988; Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, “Internationalization, Institutions, and 
Political Change,” International Organization 49: 627, 1995. 
24 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
25  Stephan Haggard, “Regionalism in Asia and the Americas,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. 
Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
26  Yi Feng and Gaspare M. Genna, “Regional Integration and Domestic Institutional Homogeneity: A 
Comparative Analysis of Regional Integration in the Americas, Pacific Asia, and Western Europe,” Review 
of International Political Economy, 10, 2003 (forthcoming). 
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the level of integration in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, but also explains 
the varying pace of integration in each case.  
 
  Although very informative about the sources of states’ preferences, the 
explanations that focus on domestic politics have little to say about the dynamics of 
change in international power relations in the process of regional integration. These 
approaches convincingly explain economic policy choices by national governments; 
however, regional integration, by definition, is an outcome of joint decisions by two or 
more countries. Over the long run, because of the differential rates of growth, relative 
strengths and bargaining positions of countries change.
27  Hence, any account of regional 
integration must take into consideration both country preferences and international power 
relations.  
 
Explaining Regional Integration through Power Relations and Domestic Influences 
Each of the prior perspectives provides useful insights into the sources of regional 
integration. At the same time, the complexity of regional integration renders none of 
these approaches as complete explanations. Our aim in explaining integration is modest. 
Drawing upon the existing literature, we will formulate testable hypotheses with specific 
reference to Latin American and Caribbean integration. The list of hypotheses will not be 
exhaustive; nonetheless, taken as a whole, they tap into the core propositions raised by 
the extant literature. In so doing, we will focus on (neo)realist propositions and domestic 
politics hypotheses. The central question is why integration occurs in some places at 
certain times but not in others. The focus on states’ preferences and international power 
relations are best suited to answer this question.  
 
  The central hypothesis of this paper is:  
Regional integration is more likely to develop as the relative 
economic power of countries in such arrangements is asymmetric 
and they share similar or compatible preference profiles.  
 
This hypothesis derives from the notion that the interaction of the variables (power 
asymmetry and preference similarity or compatibility) explains the increased propensity 
for integration. Each alone tells us little. When there is parity in economic capabilities, 
neither country has the capability to coordinate liberalization. Since both have similar 
strengths, it would be difficult for each to bare the burdens of readjustment. While this  
situation is not present under preponderance, the preponderant economic power may see 
no or few benefits in investing resources to promote integration with small neighboring 
countries when preferences are not similar. However, as the distribution of economic 
                                                 
27 Organski, World Politics, 1958; Organski, World Politics, 1968; Organski and Kugler, “The Costs of 
Major Wars;” Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Tammen et al, Power Transitions.  See Douglas 
Lemke, “Small States and War,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds), Parity and War (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1996 and Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) for application to local hierarchies. 
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capabilities between countries grows more asymmetric, it makes more sense for these 
states to enter negotiations about economic cooperation if both parties jointly find it in 
their interest to do so. In addition to the efficiency gains expected to result from 
economies of scale and the expansion of the market, states with asymmetric power and 
common interests may pursue a strategy of economic integration in order to increase their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis powers outside the region.  
 
  What interests do states have to have in common in order to enter negotiations 
over regional integration? The political economy of international economic policy 
literature suggests that there must be sufficient interests among domestic groups in 
regional economic integration. One powerful source of integration interest is private 
businesses that anticipate gains from the expansion of a stable market. Consumers are 
also potential beneficiaries from integration because increased competition and 
economies of scale will supply goods and services of higher quality at more competitive 
prices. However, the diffusion of consumer interests promotes greater problems of 
collective action than certain business interests that have stakes in promoting or stalling 
integration. In the subsequent data analysis, we examine mutual trade interests as one 
source of states’ interests in regional economic integration. We can now restate the 
general hypothesis of this research:  
 
H1:  The level of regional economic integration is higher between 
pairs of countries when their economic sizes are asymmetrical and 
they both have strong mutual trade interests in expanding and 
securing their markets.  
 
  Moreover, a number of (neo)realist scholars argue that economic integration is 
more likely among countries that share similar foreign policy preference profiles. Hence, 
by measuring countries’ foreign relations preference profiles by alliance portfolios:   
 
H2:  States with similar alliance portfolios are more likely to 
pursue integration than those with dissimilar ones under power 
preponderance.  
 
Finally, we consider the timing of integration. We can explain the start or a 
change in the level of integration as a discrete event given the relative power between any 
two countries. After a power transition, research has shown that the probability of 
conflict initiation increases. In contrast, when two countries are jointly satisfied with their 
dyadic relations, peaceful transitions ensue.
28 We therefore pose the following: 
 
H3:  The initiation of regional integration and change in its level 
are more likely to occur when economic powers of countries to 
such arrangements are more asymmetrical and they both have 
mutual trade interests.  
 
                                                 
28 Carole Alsharabati, Dynamics of War Initiation, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 
1997); Efird and Genna, “Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration.” 
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Joint satisfaction due to similar alliance portfolios is also expected to produce the same 
results: 
 
H4:  The initiation of regional integration and change in its level 
are more likely to occur when economic powers of countries to 
such arrangements are asymmetric and they both have similar 
alliance portfolios.  
 
The data analysis tests these hypotheses against the achievement of integration 
between pairs of Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1960 to 1997. The data 
set includes all politically relevant dyads (defined as contiguous states or those within 
250 miles if separated by a body of water). During this period, four regional economic 
integrations were observed: Mercosur/Mercosul, the Andean Pact, CACM/SICA, and 
CARICOM.
29  Table 1 presents information on member-countries and the years in which 
they joined these regional economic agreements.  
 
Table 1:  Regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Group  Full Name  Member Nations  Year 
ANCOM Andean  Common  Market  Bolivia  1969-1981,  1992
   Chile  1969-1976 
   Colombia  1969 
   Ecuador  1969-1992,  1993
   Peru  1969-1992,  1993
   Venezuela  1973 
CACM  Central American Common Market  Costa Rica  1960-1969, 1990
SICA (est. 1992)  Central American Integration System El Salvador  1960-1969, 1990
   Guatemala  1960-1969,  1990
   Honduras  1960-1969,  1990
   Nicaragua  1960-1969,  1990
    Panama (SICA only)  1992 
CARICOM Caribbean  Community  Anguilla  2000 
    Antigua & Barbuda  1968 
   Bahamas  1968 
   Barbados  1968 
   Belize  1968 
   Dominica  1968 
   Grenada  1968 
   Guyana  1968 
   Haiti  1998 
                                                 
29 This list excludes NAFTA.   
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   Jamaica  1968 
   Montserrat  1968 
    St. Kitts & Nevis  1968 
   St.  Lucia  1968 
    St. Vincent & the Grenadines  1968 
   Suriname  1996 
   Trinidad  &  Tobago  1968 
MERCOSUR  Southern Cone Common Market  Argentina  1991 
   Bolivia  (FTA  member)  1997 
   Brazil  1991 
   Chile  (FTA  member)  1997 
   Paraguay  1991 
   Uruguay  1991 
The basic version of the OLS model to estimate levels of integration is: 
YDYADi,t = α + β0YDYADi,t-1 + βkXDYADi,t-1 + βzDPROJECTSi,t + εDYADi,t 
where YDYADi,t is the dependent variable of this study—the integration achievement score 
(IAS)—for dyad i during year t, YDYADi,t-1 is the lagged dependent variable, XDYADi,t-1 is 
the vector of lagged independent variables,  and  k equals the number of independent 
variables. DPROJECTSi,t is the vector of dummy variables representing regional integration 
fixed effects, with z representing the number of integration projects minus one. This latter 
group also includes a dummy variable that represents dyads that are not members of 
integration projects. We look at regional integration fixed effects instead of dyad fixed 
effects to control for differences among projects instead of among dyads. In each 
equation, the Andean Pact is the excluded group. 
  
We measure economic integration by the degree of integration between dyads of 
countries based on six Guttmann scale categories:  (1) mobility of goods and services; (2) 
capital mobility; (3) labor mobility; (4) supranational institutional building; (5) monetary 
policy coordination; and (6) fiscal policy coordination. We assign each category a value 
between 0 and 5 (with higher values indicating greater integration). These values are then 
summed across all six categories and averaged to generate the integration achievement 
score (IAS). The IAS’s possible range is from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 6.
30 
The IAS for the four Latin American and Caribbean economic integrations is summarized 
in Table 2. The appendix provides the IAS’s coding scheme.  
 
 
                                                 
30  The score was first developed in Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, Western Hemisphere and 
Economic Integration (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994) and further developed 
in Genna, Changing Power, Sovereignty, and Loyalty in the European Union and used in Efird and Genna, 
“Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration,  and Feng and Genna, “Regional 
Integration and Domestic Institutional Homogeneity.” 
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Table 2:  Integration achievement scores (1960-1997) 
Group Year  G&S  Cap Lab SI  MC FC IAS 
ANCOM  1969-70  2  1 0 1 0 0  0.667 
ANCOM  1971-77  2  2 0 1 0 0  0.833 
ANCOM  1978  2  2 0 1 1 0  1.000 
ANCOM  1979-83  2  2 0 2 1 0  1.167 
ANCOM  1984-90  2  2 0 2 2 0  1.333 
ANCOM  1991-93  2  3 0 2 2 0  1.500 
ANCOM  1994-95  3  3 1 3 2 0  2.000 
ANCOM  1996-97  4  3 1 3 2 0  2.167 
CACM  1963-89  1  1 0 1 1 0  0.667 
CACM  1990  1  1 1 2 1 0  1.000 
CACM/SICA  1991-92  1  1 1 2 1 0  1.000 
CACM/SICA  1993-97  2  1 1 2 1 0  1.167 
CARICOM 1965-72  2  1 0 1 0 0  0.667 
CARICOM 1973  2 1  0  2  0  0  0.833 
CARICOM 1974-82  3  2 0 2 0 0  1.167 
CARICOM 1983-88  3  2 0 2 2 0  1.500 
CARICOM 1989-90  3  3 0 2 2 0  1.667 
CARICOM 1991-95  4  3 0 2 2 0  1.833 
CARICOM 1996-97  4  3 1 2 2 0  2.000 
MERCOSUR  1991-93  1  0 0 1 0 0  0.333 
MERCOSUR 1994  1  1 1 2 0 0  0.833 
MERCOSUR  1995-97  4  1 1 2 0 0  1.333 
Note:  See Appendix for the description of the coding scheme. 
 
  We operationalize the independent variables as follows: power preponderance is 
the natural log of absolute difference in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of pairs of 
countries, plus one (in current US dollars):  
 
Power Preponderance = ln (|GDPi – GDPj| + 1) 
This generates a variable that ranges from 0 to 27.43. This allows us to interpret the 
variable, “preponderance,” as follows: larger values indicate greater economic power 
asymmetry. The value of 0 represents a complete parity in economic power of two paired 
countries, while 27.43 is the highest degree of asymmetry in our sample.  
 
Mutual trade interest is the total volume of exports among country dyads as a 
percentage of the dyad GDP (in millions of current US dollars):  
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

  
The variables preponderance and mutual trade interest are then interacted to test 
hypotheses H1 and H3. We are interested in the degree of integration when the economic 
power of one country is relatively preponderant over the other given different levels of 
mutual trade interest. The data on GDP are collected from the Global Development 
Network Growth Database (2000). The bilateral trade figures come from International 
Monetary Fund statistics.  
 
  The S correlation computed by Curtis Signorino and Jeffrey Ritter captures the 
similarity of alliance portfolios between dyads.
31 Since the purpose of this research is to 
explain regional integration, we use the S measure for regional affairs. The S measure 
was also interacted with the preponderance variable. We used the EUGene data program 
to aggregate the alliance portfolios in a dyadic format.
32  
 
  We evaluate the arguments of this paper with the panel corrected standard error 
(PCSE) OLS regression method using time-series cross-section data and the Cox 
proportional hazards regression method using event history data of Latin American and 
Caribbean dyads for the years 1960-1997. We use PCSE OLS regression because it 
makes it possible to correctly estimate the sampling variability of the OLS estimates even 
when panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneously correlated errors are present. 
PCSE regression also generates conservative estimates of standard errors. The inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable in the regression equation corrects for serial correlation. It 
also models the dynamic aspect of time.
33   We control for relative market size by 
including a variable that measures the dyad’s total population. We expect the relationship 
between the total population and the level of integration to take a negative sign because 
larger populations translate into larger domestic markets and might therefore have a 
lesser interest in integrating with other markets. Finally, the proportional hazards model 
is especially designed to test the influence of the independent variables on the timing of 
integration initiation and/or its increase. We code each change in the level in the IAS as 
an event. The hazard ratios of each independent variable are interpreted as the percent 
contribution during the timeframe leading toward the event.
34  
                                                 
31 Curtis Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter, “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring Similarity of Alliances and 
Interests,”  International Studies Quarterly 43: 115-144, 1999.  The S measure was downloaded from 
Richard Tucker The Similarity of Alliance Portfolios, 1816-1984, Version2.50 
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rtucker/data/alliance/similar.html, 1999.  
32 See Scott D. Bennett and Alan Stam, III, Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program 
(EUGENE).  http://wizard.ucr.edu/cps/eugene/eugene.html, 1999. 
33 Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, “What to do (and not to do with Time-Series Cross-Section Data,” 
American Political Science Review 89: 634, 1995. 
34 Hans-Peter Blossfeld, et al, Event History Analysis (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988); 
Kazuo Yamaguchi, Event History Analysis (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991). 
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Regression Results  
Table 3:  OLS regression on level of regional integration  
(Panel corrected standard errors, autocorrelation corrected, fixed effects 
models) 
 
Independent Variables  Alliance (I) Alliance (II) Trade (I)  Trade (II) 
preponderance, t-1 
 
-.0032** 
(.0016) 
.0022* 
(.0016) 
-.0036* 
(.0020) 
.0023* 
(.0013) 
alliance, t-1 
 
-.0689** 
(.0326) 
-.0275 
(.0240) 
-- 
 
-- 
mutual trade interest, t-1 
 
-- 
 
-- -34.9*** 
(12.7) 
-22.2** 
(10.03) 
preponderance×alliance, t-1 
 
.0037** 
(.0015) 
.0010** 
(.0005) 
-- 
 
-- 
preponderance×trade interest, t-1
-- 
 
-- 1.66*** 
(.590) 
.972*** 
(.465) 
Controls/Corrections      
integration level, t-1 
 
1.009*** 
(.0149) 
.7853*** 
(.0368) 
1.006*** 
(.0144) 
.7448*** 
(.0340) 
total population 
 
-- 
 
-1.03×10
-10 
(6.33×10
-11)
-- 
 
-1.30×10
-10**
(5.63×10
-11) 
no integration membership 
 
-- 
 
-.3637*** 
(.0585) 
-- 
 
-.4033*** 
(.0605) 
CACM/SICA 
 
-- 
 
-.0757 
(.0540) 
-- 
 
-.0886 
(.0579) 
CARICOM 
 
-- 
 
-.0019 
(.0455) 
-- 
 
.0284 
(.0455) 
MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL 
 
-- 
 
.0922 
(.0606) 
-- 
 
.0661 
(.0610) 
Constant 
 
.0851** 
(.0392) 
.3167*** 
(.0644) 
.1008** 
(.0482) 
.3509*** 
(.0694) 
R
2  .964 .975 .961 .974 
Wald 
2  6968.91*** 7323.29*** 5986.84***  6871.71*** 
number of observations  3660 3660 2866 2866 
number of groups  115 115 115 115 
Notes:  First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.   
***p≤.01; **p≤.05; *p≤.10.   
 
Table 3 presents the results of the first set of PCSE OLS regressions. All independent 
variables included in the causal argument are lagged by one year. Overall, the results 
indicate that the level of integration among country pairs is higher when a power 
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asymmetry exists and alliances are complementary. The first two models focus on power 
relationships and alliance portfolios. The first equation, Alliance (I), has a negative sign 
for both the preponderance variable and the alliance variable, but a positive sign for the 
interactive term (all three are significant at the p≤.05 level). When preponderance equals 
zero (i.e., a parity condition), perfectly correlated alliances (a value of one) reduces the 
level of integration by .0652 point, holding all other variables constant. When alliances 
are not correlated (a value of zero), a one-point increase in preponderance scale still 
increases the level of integration, but very slightly (b = .0005). With the inclusions of 
fixed effects and total population size (see Alliance (II) Model), the sign of 
preponderance becomes positive but those of both alliance and interactive term remain 
the same. Total population is not significant, indicating that the population size of the 
country dyad is not a significant factor affecting integration when considering power 
relationships and alliances.  
 
  The next two equations substitute the mutual trade interest variable for the 
alliance variable, with similar results. In Trade (I), we see a negative sign on the 
preponderance variable and the mutual trade interest variable, but a positive sign on the 
interactive term. When parity exists (preponderance = 0), mutual trade interest alone 
reduces the level of integration (b = -34.9). Also, when there is no mutual trade interest, 
preponderance also reduces the level of integration (b = -.0036). However, the coefficient 
of the interactive term indicates that the simultaneous presence of preponderance and 
mutual trade interest may increase the level of integration. This interactive result stands 
even when controlling for population size and individual integration project fixed effects, 
as seen in the Trade (II) equation. In this equation, the preponderance variable carries a 
positive sign, and the interactive term remains significant and positive. Total population 
size is significant and carries a negative sign; as total population size among the dyads 
increases, the level of integration decreases when we control for mutual trade interest.  
 
Figure 1:  Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients for the OLS regression 
models 
(a) Conditional coefficients of alliance at varying levels of preponderance 
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(b) Conditional coefficients of preponderance at varying levels of alliance 
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. 
The previous results can be further examined by analyzing the conditionality of 
each variable in the interaction terms of the Alliance (I) and Trade (I) equations found in 
Table 3. We calculated conditional coefficients and standard errors.
35  Figure 1, (parts a 
and b), is a graphical depiction of the conditional coefficients for the Alliance (I) model. 
The black line segment represents the portion of the conditionality that remains 
significant at the p≤.10 level, while the dashed line segment represents the portion that is 
not significant. Figure 1a depicts the conditional coefficients of alliance at varying levels 
of preponderance. As the level of preponderance increases, the alliance coefficients 
become increasingly positive. For example, when the value of preponderance is 10, the 
coefficient of alliance is negative .03 (a one-point increase in the S correlation decreases 
the level of integration in terms of IAS by .03). However, when preponderance is 25, then 
the coefficient of alliance is positive .02 (a one point increase in the S correlation 
increases the IAS score by .02). The values of preponderance between approximately 16 
and 21 are not significant, meaning that values in this range do not significantly influence 
the level of integration.  
 
Figure 1b depicts the conditional coefficients of preponderance at varying levels 
of the alliance variable. The results here are more interesting. As in figure 1a, as the 
values of the alliance variable increase the negative impact of preponderance diminishes. 
While the coefficient of preponderance is significant between the alliance levels of -1 to 
                                                 
35 Let Y = a + b1X + b2J + b3XJ be a model for one interaction term where the conditional effect of X on Y 
is given by: Y/X = b1|J = b1 + b3J. The conditional standard error is computed by:  
se b1|J =  3 1 3
2
1 , cov 2 var var b b J b J b    (Clark 2001). 
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0.3, it loses significance with alliance values greater than 0.3. This means that greater 
asymmetry in power under the condition of alliance portfolio incompatibility reduces the 
level of integration. When alliances are aligned, however, power preponderance has no 
statistically significant impact on integration. This explains why perfectly correlated 
portfolios and a large degree of power asymmetry, in the prior discussion, did not 
generate high estimated levels of integration. Since the alliance portfolio alignments are 
not significant beyond 0.3, a perfectly correlated portfolio would not be a good predictor 
for integration in Latin American and the Caribbean during 1960-1997. 
 
Figure 1:  Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients for the OLS regression 
models (continued) 
(c) Conditional coefficients of mutual trade interest at varying levels of 
preponderance 
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(d) Conditional coefficients of preponderance at varying levels of mutual trade 
interest 
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  Figure 1, (parts c and d), is a graphical depiction of the conditional coefficients 
for the Trade (I) model. Figure 1c depicts the conditional coefficients of mutual trade 
interests at varying levels of preponderance. Figure 1c indicates that the greater the 
presence of mutual trade interests, the greater the levels of integration when the values of 
preponderance are 22 and higher. When preponderance equals 22, the impact of mutual 
trade impact on integration is positive but slight. However, when preponderance is 
approximately 25, a 0.01 increase in the mutual trade interest variable leads to a 
corresponding 5 point increase in the level of integration. Mutual trade interest has no 
significant effect on integration between the range of 20 to 22 on the preponderance 
scale. Figure 1d, however, stands in marked contrast to figure 1b. Preponderance has 
significant effects on integration at almost all ranges of bilateral trade interests. The 
narrow range of nonsignificant values lies in the lower end of possible values 
(approximately .002 to .004). Since the range of values are small and lie in the lower end, 
prior conclusions hold: increases in mutual trade interests among country dyads have an 
increasing effect with preponderance on increasing the level of regional integration.  
 
Table 4:  OLS regression on level of regional integration  
(Panel corrected standard errors, autocorrelation corrected, fixed effects 
models) 
 
Independent Variables  Full (I)  Full (II) 
preponderance, t-1 
 
-.0056*** 
(.0016) 
.0018* 
(.0016) 
alliance, t-1 
 
-.0701 
(.0508) 
-.0140 
(.0394) 
mutual trade interest, t-1 
 
-30.41** 
(12.79) 
-22.14** 
(10.34) 
preponderance×alliance, t-1 
 
.0035 
(.002) 
.0004 
(.0017) 
preponderance×trade interest, t-1
 
1.437** 
(.5961) 
.9740** 
(.4801) 
Controls/Corrections    
integration level, t-1 
 
1.006*** 
(.0145) 
.7451*** 
(.0400) 
total population 
 
-- 
 
-1.08×10
-10* 
(6.33×10
-11) 
no integration membership 
 
-- 
 
-.4051*** 
(.0603) 
CACM/SICA 
 
-- 
 
-.0884 
(.0580) 
CARICOM 
 
-- 
 
.0265 
(.0453) 
MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL 
 
-- 
 
.0649 
(.0685) 
Constant  .1419*** .3661*** 
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  (.0412) (.0625) 
R
2  .961 .974 
Wald 
2  7482.96***  7064.30*** 
number of observations  2866 2866 
number of groups  115 115 
Notes:  First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.   
***p≤.01; **p≤.05; *p≤.10.   
 
  Table 4 completes our explanation for the level of regional integration. In these 
equations, both alliance and mutual trade interest variables are entered simultaneously. 
Full (I) indicates that alliance portfolios are not a significant predictor of integration, 
either independently or by an interactive term with preponderance, when included with 
mutual trade interests, which remain significant both independently and by the interactive 
term. Therefore, the condition of preponderance with increasing levels of mutual trade 
interest is a better explanation for the levels of integration. Full (II) adds the population 
control and fix effects variables and is not very different from Trade (II) equation, which 
shows the robustness of our findings. When attempting to explain the level of regional 
integration, domestic factors, such as mutual trade interests, are more significant than 
regional factors such as alignments of alliance portfolios.  
 
Table 5:  Cox proportional hazards regression for the timing of regional integration 
 
Independent Variables 
Hazard Ratio
(standard 
error) p-values 
preponderance 
 
.637 
(.047) .000 
alliance 
 
.007 
(.012) .004 
mutual trade interest 
 
.028 
(.040) .011 
preponderance × alliance 
 
1.276 
(.100) .002 
preponderance × trade interest 
 
1.215 
(.080) .003 
log likelihood  -1118.30  
LR 
2(5)  144.84 .000 
number of observations  315  
Note:  p-values are for two-tailed tests 
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Table 5 presents the results of the hypotheses regarding the timing of integration 
through the use of the Cox proportional hazards method. Mutual trade interest is 
expressed as a percentage to improve interpretability of the results. The results support 
our hypotheses that the probability of initiating integration or increasing its level is 
enhanced when preponderance, mutual trade interests, and aligned alliance portfolios all 
increase in value. Individually they diminish the probability of initiating or increasing the 
level of integration, as indicated by the hazard ratios being less than one. When included 
as interaction terms, they improve the odds of the timing of integration, as indicated by 
the ratios being greater than one. Under a condition of neutrality (alliance = 0), and no 
mutual trade interest, the probability of initiating or increasing integration decreases by 
36.3% ((0.6368 – 1) × 100%) for every unit increase in preponderance. Under parity, and 
no mutual trade interest, the probability of initiating or increasing integration decreases 
by 99.3% for every unit increase in alliance. Under parity and neutrality, the probability 
of initiating or increasing integration decreases by 97.2% for every percent increase in 
mutual trade interest. However, when preponderance, alliance similarities, and mutual 
trade interest are present, they increase the probability of initiating or increasing 
integration. There is a 27.6% probability of initiating or increasing integration for every 
increase in level of the product of preponderance and alliance. In addition, there is a 
21.5% probability of initiating or increasing integration for every increase in level of the 
product of preponderance and mutual trade interest. Therefore, probability improves the 
more asymmetrical the power relationship between country pairs, the greater their mutual 
trade interests, and the more similar their alliances. 
 
Conclusion 
The political elite of many countries initiated integration projects in Europe, Asia and the 
Pacific, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East, marking a surge of 
integration in the latter half of the twentieth century and moving into the twenty-first. A 
number of economists and political scientists from a diverse set of intellectual traditions 
have sought to explain this new development in the international political economy. Each 
of these schools has contributed to our understanding of the dynamics and consequences 
of regional economic integration. The present research joined this intellectual exchange 
on the determinants of regional economic integration by proposing a set of testable 
hypotheses and conducting a regression analysis using Latin American and Caribbean 
data from 1960 to 1997.  
 
  The results of the data analysis largely confirmed the central argument of this 
paper. Namely, the propensity for regional economic integration increases when 
economic capabilities of a pair of countries in such arrangements are asymmetrical if they 
have mutual trade interests and similar alliance portfolios. These results stayed significant 
even when controlling for dyad population size. We also found that domestic factors are a 
stronger predictor in explaining the levels of integration. While misaligned alliances 
proved to be helpful in explaining why dyads have particular levels of integration, 
aligned alliance portfolios proved to be not significant. Moreover, when included in the 
same equation, alliance portfolios were not significant while mutual trade interest 
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remained significant. Therefore, the strength in explaining the level of Latin American 
and Caribbean integration lies in mutual trade interest among country pairs (as well as 
power asymmetries) more so than region-wide alliances. Finally, the timing of 
integration’s initiation or change is also explained by the interaction of preponderance 
with alliance portfolios and mutual trade interest.  
 
  This research can benefit from further sophistication. First, the sources of state 
preferences may include more nuanced measures of the relative strength of pro-
integration and anti-integration forces. Data on the strengths of manufacturing, financial, 
agricultural, and other sectors may be used to construct such variables. Second, it may be 
fruitful to consider preferences of government leaders regarding integration. For example, 
what are the ideological positions of state leaders and ruling parties on integration issues? 
Why do they sometimes pursue policies that favor some societal groups over others in a 
way that is not accounted for by pluralism? How do institutions shape interest 
representation and decision-making processes in a polity?  
 
Finally, studies in (neo)functionalism and neoinstitutionalism have generated 
many interesting propositions and implications that can be tested with regional 
integration projects around the world. Have such projects promoted efficiency gains and 
facilitated cooperation among member-countries by helping to overcome collective 
action problems and by offering information and transparency as anticipated? Have there 
been unanticipated costs and benefits arising from earlier moves towards economic 
integration? Regional integration offers a number of interesting topics for future research.  
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Appendix:  Integration Achievement Score (coding system) 
 
1. Trade in Goods and Services 
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
1 = Preferential Trade Agreement 
2 = Partial Free Trade Area 
3 = Full Free Trade Area 
4 = Customs Union 
5 = No barriers among member countries 
 
2. Degree of Capital Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility 
1 = Foreign Direct Investment allowed in limited form 
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed 
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government procurement 
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large scale merges and acquisitions 
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction 
 
3. Degree of Labor Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility 
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions 
2 = Full right of movement 
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted 
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices 
5 = Full freedom of movement 
 
4. Level of Supranational Institution Importance 
0 = No supranational institutions 
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions 
2 = Information gathering and advisory role 
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals 
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals 
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node 
 
5. Degree of Monetary Policy Coordination 
0 = No monetary policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitment to maintain parity  
3 = Coordinated interventions 
4 = Regional Central Bank establishment 
5 = Single currency 
 
6. Degree of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
0 = No fiscal policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation 
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments 
4 = Uniform tax code 
5 = Single budget 
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